

# Scalable Key Rank Estimation Algorithm for Large Keys

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## Side-channel attacks: cryptography







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### Side-channel attacks: cryptography



#### Side-channel attacks



Divide-and-conquer strategy.

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Divide-and-conquer strategy.

$k_0$	$k_1$	<i>k</i> <sub>2</sub>	•••	k <sub>15</sub>
0X2a,0.125	0X23,0.128	0X10,0.325		0X45,0.347
0Xcd,0.100	0X51,0.045	0X01,0.204		0Xdc,0.210
0Xae,0.050	0Xff,0.035	0X13,0.036		0X83,0.151
0X63,0.025	0X2b,0.025	0X58,0.029		0X13,0.035

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Enough side-channel information

 $\Rightarrow$  direct recovery (attack)

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Enough side-channel information ⇒ direct recovery (attack)

overy

Not Enough side-channel information, enough computational power ⇒ enumeration (attack)

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Enough side-channel information ⇒ direct recovery (attack) Not Enough side-channel information, enough computational power ⇒ enumeration (attack) Not Enough side-channel information, not enough computational power ⇒rank estimation (key needed, evaluation)

- 1. Previous solutions
- 2. New solution
- 3. Experimental results
- 4. Conclusion

## **Previous solutions**

Problem

$$\mathsf{rank}(k) = \#\{k^* | \mathsf{Pr}[k^* | \mathrm{SCI}] \ge \mathsf{Pr}[k | \mathrm{SCI}]\}.$$

 $\#\{k^*\} \ge 2^{128}$ 

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Divide-and-conquer approach on independent subkeys



**Problem** 

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 $\#\{k^*\} \ge 2^{128}$ 

Divide-and-conquer approach on independent subkeys



 $\label{eq:space carving } \begin{array}{l} \{k^*\} \mbox{ into 3 parts:} \\ < \Pr[k|{\rm SCI}] & ? & \Pr[k|{\rm SCI}] < \end{array}$ 

Smaller is the part ? the more accurate is the rank estimation

Method	Pros	Cons
Eurocount'13	First solution, can compute	Quite slow, quite loose
Eurocrypt 15	the exact rank (in theory)	bounds (in practice)
Pro'15		
FSE'15		
Asiacrypt' 15		
CT-RSA'17		
CHES'17		
This paper		

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CHES'17	Really fast even for large key	Expected value of the rank, not rank estimation		
This paper	Fast, tight estimation of the rank even for large key	Less efficient than CHES'17		

## The histogram solution (FSE'15)

	k1				$k_2$	
Candidate	Pr	log	bin	Pr	log	bin
0	0.6643	-0.5901	1	0.0012	-9.7027	3
1	0.2588	-1.9501	1	0.0011	-9.8283	3
2	0.0313	-4.9977	2	0.3588	-1.4787	1
3	0.0412	-4.6012	2	0.0713	-3.8100	1
4	0.0001	-13.2877	4	0.5643	-0.8255	1
5	0.0020	-8.9658	3	0.0012	-9.7027	3
6	0.0013	-9.5873	3	0.00005	-14.2877	4
7	0.0010	-9.9658	3	0.00205	-8.9302	3



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#### Mix result

Perform convolution of histogram

$$conv(h_1, h_2)[i] = \sum_{j=0}^{i} h_1[j]h_2[i-j]$$





Size of  $H_i$  grows

#### Limitation for larger keys

For large number of dimension we perform convolution on larger and larger histograms: could be costly.



Can the cost be linear in the number of subkeys?

**New solution** 

#### Keep the size of the histogram constant



#### Why does it work?

Similar to classical histogram solution we can keep track of the position (bin of the key)

Similar as dividing the number of bins by the number of subkeys

Convolution need equally bin sized histogram: need a balanced tree structure



Similar as doing classical histogram convolution with large bin

- But a better tracking of the estimation error
- $\nu$  : number of subkeys
- $\epsilon:$  size of bin /2

Method	error	cost
Classical FSE'15	$ u\epsilon$	quadratic
Reduced FSE'15	$\nu^2 \epsilon$	linear
Batching	$(\nu + \log_2(\nu)\frac{\nu}{2})\epsilon$	linear

# **Experimental results**

- ▶ Matlab implementation (limited to 1024-bit key)
- ▶ C implementation

Leakages: subkey+noise (S-box)

Size of subkey: 8-bit

Number of subkeys: 8-1024

Number of bins: tightness-efficiency parameter

#### Efficiency



Our solution has a complexity linear in the number of subkeys

#### Tightness



Works for very long key, with tightness damage

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Works for very long key, with tightness damage



Adapted number of bin to have similar tightness

### Similar tightness CHES'17



CHES'17 solution is not so tight (6 bits, and cannot be tightened) all solutions are efficient (< 0.1s)

## Conclusion

Trick for rank estimation for large keys

Tight and efficient method

#### **Conclusion & open problems**

Trick for rank estimation for large keys

- Tight and efficient method
- Limited to independent attack



# Thanks!

# Questions?

# Comments?